Parent-Child Immunity: The Case for Abolition
"However repugnant it may seem that a minor child should

sue his own father, it is equally repugnant that a child injured by
his parent's negligence, perhaps maimed for life should have no
redress for the injury he has suffered."' This anomaly exists

today in the majority of jurisdictions which recognize the parentchild immunity. The origins of the rule, its exceptions and its

present status nationwide and in California reflect a judicial
determination not to interfere with the basic unit of our society,

the family.
The history of the parental immunity in the United States
begins with2 the 1891 case of Hewellette v. George. Without

citation of judicial authority,4 the Mississippi Supreme Court
denied a child's tort action against her mother for false
imprisonment in order to preserve "the peace of society, and of
the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests

of society. '

5

The rationale underlying the rule is not that the

parent lacks a legal obligation to refrain from physically

I. Fidelity& Casualty Co. v. Marchland, 4 D.L.R. 157, 166 (1924).
2. There is a conflict of authority as to whether the parental immunity was part of
the common law. The confusion arises because there are no reported English cases
deciding whether a child could maintain a personal injury action against his parent. Thus,
some courts argue that there was no such cause of action at common law because the
immunity prevented litigation. E.g., Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789
(1962); Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954); Redding v. Redding, 235
N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Owens v. Auto. Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So.
133 (1937); Materese v. Materese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Smith v. Smith, 81
Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
Other courts have interpreted the lack of cases to show there was no parental immunity
at common law. See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Dean v. Smith,
106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743
(1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
3. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4. Suit against one in loco parentis had previously been allowed but was not referred
to by the Hewellette court. Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885)
(recovery against guardian for negligence in not properly clothing a minor child); Lander
v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859) (recovery in action against a schoolmaster
for assault and battery); Gould v. Christianson. 10 F. Cas. 864 (No. 5636) (S.D.N.Y.
1836) (minor recovered against shipmaster for assault and battery). See generally
McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 IIARV. L. RI v. 1030, 106i63 (1943).
5. 68 Miss. at 71 I, 9 So. at 887.
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abusing his child, but rather that the child has no right to sue his

parents" for their tortious misfeasance
The courts have advanced several theories to support

parental immunity.8 The overriding consideration in the majority
of cases is the public interest in the preservation of domestic
tranquility. Since the family is the basic unit of our social

structure, the courts reason that if the family is disrupted, the
smooth functioning of society as a whole is threatened. 10 In

weighing the benefit to the child in obtaining damages for his
injuries against the societal interest in the maintenance of family

harmony unvexed by the threat of litigation, the judicial balance
has been tilted in favor of domestic peace."
The logic of this reasoning is based more on emotional

rhetoric than on the realities of the family setting. At common
law, suits between parent and child concerning property 2 and
contractual rights 13 were permissible. Since domestic harmony is
6. This was carried to an absurdity in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(1905) where the court denied civil recovery to a daughter who was raped by her father.
See also McKelvey v. McKelvey, I I I Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (stepmother was not
liable for inflicting cruel and inhuman punishment on her son's child with his consent).
7. Misfeasance as opposed to nonfeasance is the only duty litigated in reported cases
holding a parent liable for intentional and malicious torts. See cases cited note 47 infra.
With respect to negligent torts, most reported cases refer to automobile accidents which
also involve misfeasance.
In Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wisc. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968), the court found that
parent's failure to instruct their child on how to cross the street after leaving the school
bus was within the discretionary area of parental control and they were not liable for the
resulting injury. This decision suggests that the courts will place nonfeasance under the
discretionary protectorate while holding parent's liable for misfeasance.
8. See generally McCurdy, supra note 4; Comment, A Proposed Modification of the
Parental Inmunity Doctrine, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 346-49 (1962).
9. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); London Guar. & Accident Co.
v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251
P.2d 149 (1952); Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205 (1941); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. II, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939): Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538
(1932). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 887 (3d ed. 1964).
10. For a general summary of the basis of the family harmony doctrine see Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
II. See Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964), noted in 20 OKLA. L. REV. 93
(1967). Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 2, 156 S.E. 750, 751 (1931): "It is deemed better
that an occasional wrong should go unrequitted than that family life should be subjected
to the disrupting effects of such suits."
12. Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); McLain v. McLain, 80
Okla. 113, 194 P. 894 (1921); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Alston
v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859), 41 MARQ. L. REV. 188, 195 (1957); 51 HARV. L. REV. 1451
(1938).
13. Sokolowski v. Lucey, 47 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio App. 1941); Bunton v. Newell, 239
S.W. 1096 (Mo. App. 1922).
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threatened regardless of the form of the suit, why do the courts
deny the child a cause of action for personal injuries against the
parent? The prospect of reconciliation between parent and child
is enhanced as much by monetary reparation as by the denial of
relief. Moreover, after a personal injury has been inflicted, there
may be little domestic harmony, if any, to be preserved.
Another line of reasoning employed to justify the existence
of the immunity is that recovery by one child would deplete the
family exchequer to the detriment of the plaintiff's brothers and
sisters. 15 This argument ignores the fact that a parent has the
power to distribute his favors among his offspring according to
his whim since his children have no legal claim to any portion of
his property nor a right to an equal share. 6 A monetary award
would compensate for an injury actually incurred by one child
and is not tantamount to unequal material consideration of the
7
other children.
The possibility of the wrongdoer's succession to the money
has also been relied on to sustain the immunity. 8 Since the
parent would be the next of kin if the child died intestate, he
might inherit the child's property including the damages paid.
This argument is most persuasive when insurance is present since
any funds inherited by the parent would be a windfall rather than
a mere repossession of money previously set aside for the child's
use. However, the possibility is remote, and even if it occurred,
the courts have allowed recovery under the same contingency in
property actions."0
The force of these arguments has been diminished, however,
by the prevalent use of insurance. Although the fact of insurance
14. Suits have been allowed in essentially every area other than negligent personal
injury. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. at 305-06, 135 A.2d at 75-76 (1957) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting): "Countless pages in law books are devoted to the description of pitched
battles between children and parents over wills, inheritances, settlement, partnerships, real
estate, personal property and business deals of every character."
15. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 47 (1960); Roller v, Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 244-45, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905). In Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356, 150 A.
905, 909 (1930), the court called this argument "a mere makeweight."
16. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 356, 150 A. at 909.
17. See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra; See also Union Bank & Trust Co. v.
First Nat'l Bank, 362 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1966); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d
410 (1965).
18. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. at 244-45, 79 P. at 789.
19. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 225 (West 1957).
20. See cases and text accompanying note 12 supra.
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coverage alone does not create a cause of action where none
would otherwise exist,2 1 the courts have recognized that the

presence of liability insurance coverage is an important
consideration in deciding whether to abrogate the parental

immunity.2 Recovery from an insurance company ends the fear
of impoverishing the family: Instead of depleting the family
exchequer available for the care of the injured child, insurance

coverage would add funds otherwise unavailable for such care.
Moreover, since the parent would not personally have to
compensate the child, there is less chance that effective discipline
would be undermined or that domestic harmony would be

disrupted by the litigation!"
However, the possibility of recovery under the terms of an
insurance policy also presents the most cogent argument in favor

of parental immunity: the danger of fraud 24 and collusion by the
defendant parent against the insurance company.25 Recovery
21. Virtually all of the courts agree that the fact of insurance alone will not allow a
child to recover if he would otherwise have been barred. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1948); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Signs v. Signs, 156
Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468
(1938); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Owens v. Auto. Mut.
Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E.
12 (1923); 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 310, 311-12 (1959).
22. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn, 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
437, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) contains a particularly good
discussion of the effects of insurance on the courts.
Many states also have compulsory insurance statutes which would refute this
argument. E.g., N.Y. 'VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 310 (McKinney 1960). The majority in
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969) mentioned such
compulsory coverage as a consideration in abrogating the immunity.
23. In Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. at 296, 135 A.2d at 76 (1957), the court observed
that the presence of insurance may even weld the family closer together since they then
strive for the common good of the injured child.
24. McCurdy, supra note 4, at 1072-73, discusses an additional danger of fraud
relating to suits brought by children, after reaching majority, for injuries inflicted during
minority. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Treschman v.
Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 209, 61 N.E. 961, 963 (1901) (dictum). The relevant
question is whether the Statute of Limitations will apply. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d at 435, 245 N.E.2d at 193; Dunlap v. Dunlap. 84 N.H. at 351, 150 A. at 909;
McCurdy, supra note 4, at 1072-73. The cases implicitly assume that the disability of
minority will toll the statute and question whether the consequent lapse of time would
open the door to fraudulent claims. Garcia v. Fantauzzi, 20 F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1927)
(plaintiff was a minor).
25. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d at 679 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930);
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under the policy depends upon a finding of the insured's liability.
Thus, the parent is confronted with the dilemna of cooperating
with the insurance company as a defendant and at the same time
furthering the successful outcome of the suit for the benefit of his
child 2 In balancing these two alternatives, the protection of his
own child 7 and the preservation of the family pocketbook would
certainly weigh heavily in the parent's mind. Since a minor can
not sue his parent without acting through a guardian, probably
the other parent,2 8 the insured necessarily exercises some
influence over the child's ultimate decision. The risk of collusion
could be substantial. Many suits involving insurance, however,
have this potential risk of fraud. Therefore, this danger is not a
sufficient reason to deny the cause of action but rather
admonishes the court and jury to exercise added caution when
examining and assessing the facts.' In addition, the insurance
company should be allowed to impeach its insured as an adverse
party3 If necessary to counteract the incidence of fraud, the
insurance company could exclude coverage for an action b'etween
an unemancipated child and his parents.3 1 This precaution would
not only eliminate the court's reliance on insurance as a basis for
eliminating the parental immunity but would in effect direct the
court's attention to the underlying problem: A child has been
injured without possibility of redress based solely on the public
policy argument of maintaining family harmony. If a suit is
contemplated, surely family harmony is already so diminished
that it would be grotesque to deny the child a remedy in order to
preserve that harmony While it is doubtful that a child would
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. 2d 438 (1938); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. at 29394, 135 A.2d at 72-74; Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1935).
26. See 47 MARQ. L. REV. 423, 425 (1963).
27. See discussion in Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 250, 163 A.2d 147, 150
(1960), assailing reliance on insurance because of the risks of collusion inherent in the
family's decision to sue.
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 885 & n. 81 (3d ed. 1964).
29. Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. at 426, 142 N.W.2d at 73; Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
437, 439, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); Badigan v. Badigan, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 42, 174
N.E.2d 718, 725 (1961) (Fuld, J. dissenting); contra, Hastings v. Hastings. 33 N.J. at
250, 163 A.2d at 150.
30. James, The Impact of Insurance on the Law oJ Torts, 15 LAW & CONTMItP.
PROB. 431, 433 (1950). In California the fact of insurance coverage could not be shown
to prove negligence, but could be introduced to show fraud and collusion. CAL. LvID.
CODE § 1155 (West 1967).
31. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 571, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
32. Badigan v. Badigan, 215 N.Y.S. 35, 40, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722 (1961) (Fuld, J.
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be counselled to sue without insurance protection, 33 the right to
sue should nevertheless be available.
Parents are given wide discretion in exercising the right to

discipline their children. This disciplinary power is derived from
the parent's duty to nurture, protect and educate his offspring.
The child has the reciprocal duty to serve and obey his parents.-4

Through the interaction of these duties, the interest of society in
the upbringing of children is met. Courts have often affirmed

parental immunity on the supposition that its abolition would
compromise parental disciplinel Their controlling premise has

been that parental authority is so imperative that whatever may
impair it must be
Parental authority
action should not
discharge of such

foregone for the ultimate good of the child. "6
should be maintained and a personal right of
be granted to the child if it would impair the
duties. Nevertheless, these same courts have

also realized that in some situations the parent should not be
allowed to cloak his tortious wrongs under the guise of parental
discipline. They have consequently adopted certain exceptions
which allow recovery when the parent has exercised his authority
unreasonably or when his actions indicate a temporary or

permanent abandonment of the parent-child relationship.
:7
The immunity is not applicable if the child is emancipated

or has reached majority. 81 The courts reason that the public
dissenting). Judge Fuld's rationale was adopted in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d at
435, 245 N.E.2d at 193.
33. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. at 250, 163 A.2d at 150: "[W]e all know that
realistically such actions are never thought of, let alone commenced, unless there is an
insurance policy, automobile or comprehensive personal liability . . . on the basis of
which money can be sought to be obtained." James, Accident Liabiliy Reconsidered:
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 553-54 (1948).
34. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
III Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.664 (1903). The child's duty also stems from the commandment:
"Honor thy mother and thy father."
35. Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. at 253, 163 A.2d at 154; Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 297, 20 A.2d 205 (1941);
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 357, 150 A. at 910. But see Cooperrider, Child v. Parent
in Tort: A Case Jor the Jur ?, 43 MINN. L. REV. 73, 77 (1958).
36. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 357, 150 A. at 910.
37. Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Groh v. W.A. Krahm, 223
Wis. 662. 271 N.W. 374 (1937). Emancipation occurs when the parent surrenders his
right to the child's earnings and services and ends his parental control. Whether the child
is emancipated is a question of fact for the jury. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94
S.E.2d 12 (1956). The emancipation must be complete not partial. Perkins v. Robertson,
140 Cal. App. 2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956).
38. Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930). Statutes govern when
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interest in maintaining domestic tranquility terminates at this

point. Since he is no longer subject to parental discipline, the
emancipated child obtains the same status as any other guestO
Most courts also allow a suit against one who stands in
place of the parent.4 ° Since one in loco parentis assumes the role

of the parent in all respects," i it is contradictory to allow
recovery in this situation while denying compensation when the

parent commits the same act. Some courts argue that although
the relationships are similar with respect to disciplinary control,
one in loco parentis is not restrained from acting outside the
scope of this authority by the natural love and affection which
exists between parent and child.4 2 However, if the one in loco

parentis is liable for those negligent acts,

3

which by definition

are outside any restraint engendered by love and affection, why is

the parent not also liable? If one is truly in loco parentis, the
same reasons for the parental immunity should apply with equal

force. The exception has no acceptable rationale.
Another exception permits the child to recover for an injury
resulting from a business employment relationship.44 Where the

father intentionally surrenders his parental control over his child
majority is reached. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 25 (West 1954). In the majority of
jurisdictions, majority is reached at age 21.
39. Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S.E. 278 (1930); Gilliken v. Burbage,
263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
40. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Steber v. Norris, 188
Wis. 377, 206 N.W. 173 (1952); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903);
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901).
41. The one in loco parentis includes a person who is in the position to control and
discipline the child as a parent. This category may include relatives, teachers and
stepparents. See cases cited note 4 supra.
42. Comment, Parental and Interspousal Ininunity, 13 DRAKE L. REv. 160, 162
(1964); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 123, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 164 (1859).
43. Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (D.Vt. 1963); Civik v. Zylstra, 58 N.Y.
Super. 29, 155 A.2d 277 (1959). Generally the courts have denied recovery against one in
loco parentis for negligence. Brieault v. Deveau, 21 Conn. Supp. 486, 157 A.2d 604
(1960); Rowe v. Rugg, 117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W. 903 (1902); Foley v. Foley, 61 I1l. App.
577 (1895).
44. When the business is a partnership, the courts are divided on the question of
recovery. The better reasoning allows recovery because the partnership is a legal entity
with its own assets separate and distinct from its members. Cody v. J.A. Dodds & Sons,
252 Iowa 1394, 110 N.W.2d 255 (1961); 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247 (1963); 47 IowA L.
REv. 1159 (1962). But see 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 129 (1962). Other courts deny
recovery because a suit against the partnership reached the individual members and thus
was protected by the immunity if the father was a partner. E.g., Aboussie v. Aboussie,
270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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by entering into a master-servant relationship, the courts allow

recovery:15 The parent-child relationship becomes incidental and

irrelevant and the child is treated as any other member of the

public who may have been so injured. Since the parent has
assumed a dual capacity of parent and master, the courts reason
that he has injured the child as an employer, not as a parent.4 6
The final exception created by the courts allows recovery for
wilful and intentional torts.!7 The immunity does not deny that

the parent is a wrongdoer; in the interests of family harmony it
merely excuses his liability for those acts that are incidental to
the duties of a responsible parent. Since intentional misconduct is

not referable to the proper role of a parent and discourages,
rather than contributes, to domestic tranquility, recovery is

allowed. The decisions rest on a test of reasonableness 4s-was the
parent exercising reasonable disciplinary measures for the child's

welfare or was he merely venting his anger?
Within these well-defined exceptions, the majority of
jurisdictions allow the child to recover for ordinary negligence! '
In 1963, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White"0 went
further and abrogated the parental immunity rule except where

the negligent act (I) occurs when exercising reasonable parental
45. Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. II, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 112 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). For
an extensive re-examination of this exception see Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 242, 251
P.2d 149 (1952).
46. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 358-59, 150 A. at 911-12; contra, Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938). See generally Sanford, Personal Torts
within the Family, 9 "AND. L. REV. 823, 835 (1956).
47. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I11.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Wright v. Wright, 85
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Manke v. Moore, 197 Md. 6, 77 A.2d 923 (1951);
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). Hume, Intra-Family Immunity to
Suit, 17 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 45 (1966).
48. Chafin v. Chafin, 239 Ore. 374, 387, 297 P.2d 771, 777 (1964):
"[W]e conclude that an act by a parent, whether described as wilful or
malicious or wanton, which will pierce the veil of parental immunity, is an
act which is done with an intention to injure the child or is of such a cruel
nature in and of itself as to evidence not a reasonable normal parental mind,
but an evil mind . . .49. Id.; Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Parks v. Parks, 390
Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). See 12 S. DAK. L. REV. 364 (1967). Outside these
exceptions, the majority relies on the public policy argument of family unity and parental
discipline to deny recovery for ordinary negligence. See cases cited note 45 supra. Many
decisions are per curiam. E.g., Badigan v. Badigan, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718
(1961).
50. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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authority over the child; and (2) involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion as to matters of support and care such as
provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services
and other such care.5 ' The Goller rule has been adopted by a
52
small minority of courts.
If a negligent act falls within one of the majority's
exceptions, the parent is liable in all jurisdictions. If the negligent
act involves a commonplace failure incident to the performance
of parental duties, such as failing to have a tooth filled,
forgetting a routine medical appointment or leaving the medicine
cabinet unlocked, neither the majority nor the minority will hold
the parent liable. The majority would invoke the immunity; the
minority would protect the parent under the qualifications to its
no-immunity rule. Denying recovery under these circumstances
protects society's legitimate interest in preserving the parent's
disciplinary authority and fostering family harmony. The
majority -and minority positions do conflict, however, when the
negligent act of the parent is not encompassed by the majority's
exceptions but nevertheless is outside the scope of reasonable
parental authority. The minority holds the parent liable as any
other person who has violated a reasonable standard of care and
gives the child the right to recover. The majority of courts, on
the other hand, have failed to realize that the rationale is viable
only when the parental act is consistent with reasonable parental
discretion.
The minority position does not establish clear guidelines
covering all possible circumstances which may confront the
courts. The fact situations in the cases allowing recovery for
negligence under the minority rule have been limited to injuries
resulting from automobile accidents.5 3 In the future, courts will
be compelled to decide whether a parent's careless operation of
his automobile is ordinary negligence for which a child can
51. Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
52. Silesky v. Kelman, Minn. -,
161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Hebel v. Hebel,
435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967). One jurisdiction has abrogated the immunity without
qualification. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 437, 224 A.2d 588 (1966). Some jurisdictions
have used the Goller rationale to abrogate the immunity in cases where the parent sues
the child. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969): Baits v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d
695 (1965); Shenk v. Shenk, - Ill. - , 241 N.E,2d 12 (1968).
53. Cases cited note 52 supra; set, Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d
341 (1968) (denial of a cause of action in a non-automobile case).
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recover or an act involving the reasonable exercise of parental
discretion. The Goller rule leaves such distinctions unsettled.

However, the minority at least recognizes that under such
circumstances the child should have the right to sue; the majority

would deny him the right by invoking an immunity whose
rationale does not apply to these negligent torts.
In contrast to its landmark decisions in other areas of tort

law, "' California has not followed the minority trend in the area
of parent-child immunity.5 5 In addition to the unconvincing

reasons adopted by the majority, California decisions have relied
on an analogy with the husband and wife immunity to support
the parental immunity.5 At common law, the husband-wife
immunity was based on a legal fiction which viewed the husband
and wife as a single entity in the person of the husband..5 7 Since
the wife lacked the capacity to contract, to sue or be sued
without the joinder of her husband, the courts held that neither

spouse could maintain an action in contract or tort against the
other. The legal unity of husband and wife continued until the
passage of the married women's acts in the late nineteenth
century. 8 These legislative enactments insured the wife's separate
legal identity through which she could sue without having to join

her husband. Despite this reform, husband and wife were
54. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., Adv. Cal....., 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969) (manufacturer liable in strict liability to bystander); Dillon v. Legg, 68
Adv. Cal. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (liability for negligently inflicted
emotional distress outside the zone of danger); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Adv. Cal. 89,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (eliminating no duty limitations between owners
and occupiers of land).
55. The California courts adopted the majority exceptions to the parental immunity.
Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (wilful and wanton injuries);
Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956); Martinez v. So. Pac. Co.,
45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955) (emancipated child exception); Gillett v. Gillett, 168
Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 726 (1959) (intentional torts).
California has not adopted the business exception, Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation
Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938), nor allowed recovery against one in loco
parentis for ordinary negligence. Trudell v. Leatherly, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (193 1); Emery
v. Emery, supra (recovery against one in loco parentis for wanton and wiful injuries).
56. E.g., Trudell v. Leatherly, 212 Cal. at 680, 300 P. at 9. The analogy to husband
and wife has not been limited to California. See Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77,
145 A. 753 (1929); McKelvey v. McKelvey, I I Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.2d 664 (1903).
57. See generally McCurdy, Torts between Parent and Child, 5 ,ILL. L. REV. 521,
521-27 (1960).
58. In California, the act was passed in 1913 and is now codified in CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 370 (\vest 1954).
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precluded from suing each other in tort 9 in order to preserve
unity within the family.
Parent-child immunity, on the other hand, never labored

under the pretense of a single identity;'" consequently, children
were always entitled to hold property in their own name, as well
as to contract with and sue their parent in property actions.',

Therefore, until the passage of married women's acts the analogy
with the husband-wife immunity was fallacious. Thereafter, the

analogy was viable to the extent that the immunities protecting
both groups were founded on the preservation of family harmony
and order.

In 1962, California abrogated the husband-wife immunity."
The sole ground for reversing their position was that the

"compelling dictates of public policy" 63 no longer existed.

Paradoxically the same public policy has been upheld in the

parallel area of domestic relations- parent and child.
California and the majority of American jurisdictions have
refused to abrogate the parental immunity. Rather than allow a

child who may be crippled for life by the negligent act of his
parent to sue and recover for his injuries these courts rely on

discredited public policy arguments. Yet, husband and wife-as
well as sister and brother 6 4-may sue each other without
disrupting domestic tranquility. The qualifications adopted by
the minority recognize that within the framework of reasonable
disciplined authority parents must be accorded immunity from
litigation which would disrupt family unity. In light of the
widespread use of insurance, denying a remedy to an injured
child is something of a mockery which should be remedied.65
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